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ABSTRACT
Capacity building has become a key focus area in EU peacebuilding
and conﬂict prevention. Yet, despite considerable eﬀorts, EU
capacity building activities have struggled to deliver on their
objectives. While such programmes have sometimes been able to
strengthen pockets of capacity in speciﬁc organizations, they have
had less success in building capacity in the round and in a
sustainable manner. Drawing on empirical evidence from EU
capacity building programmes in the Horn of Africa and the
Western Balkans, this article shows that, to a great extent, this
failure has been a consequence of the diﬃculties EU capacity
builders have faced in engaging with local actors in complex
political contexts. This, in turn, has led to a “legitimacy deﬁcit” for
EU programmes, which have had little involvement from local
stakeholders and knowledge, and whose goals have often been at
odds with local preferences and priorities.
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Introduction
Capacity building forms a central pillar of international peacebuilding, conﬂict prevention
and security sector reform (SSR) eﬀorts by a variety of actors, including the European
Union (EU). It aims to strengthen the ability of governments, communities and individ-
uals in target regions to better manage the challenges of development and security that
they face. Capacity building can incorporate a range of partners, from the institutions
and organizations of states, to community groups, and civil society organizations. It com-
prises a variety of diﬀerent deliverables, including knowledge and skills, institutional infra-
structures, procedures and rules, and material equipment and technology (Safe Seas, 2017,
p. 3; Juncos et al., 2017). The EU aims to build capacity in the areas of governance, the rule
of law and security sector reform, primarily (see European Union, 2016). As such, the EU
has focused its external capacity building eﬀorts on those sectors in partner states that will
ultimately promote the EU’s own security – as such, it primarily builds partner states’
security and defence capacities.
This article draws on the experience of programmes in the Horn of Africa and the
Western Balkan regions to examine the EU’s capacity building experience to date and,
in particular, the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Somaliland. These case
studies have been chosen because they present the EU with similar challenges in capacity
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building (multi-actor complexity, as well as diﬃculties in ensuring local ownership and
sustainability) (Algar-Faria et al., 2018, p. 38). But they have also been selected because,
beyond this, the characteristics of these missions are quite diﬀerent. While the interven-
tions in both regions are ultimately responses to insecurity and attempts to conduct secur-
ity sector reform, capacity building eﬀorts in the Horn of Africa are focused on anti-piracy
operations, supporting for the most part nascent indigenous institutions to fulﬁl their
functions correctly. In the Western Balkans, meanwhile, capacity building is much
more focused on the rule of law in line with the aims of the EU’s enlargement strategy.
However, as this article will explore, the challenges that the EU has confronted in the
course of its capacity building eﬀorts in both of these regions are similar.
In this article we argue that, despite a considerable investment of resources and eﬀort,
capacity building activities have struggled to deliver on their goals. While it is possible to
identify some speciﬁc examples where local institutions or organizations have been
strengthened and despite the holistic ambitions underpinning such programmes, these
initiatives have had less success in building capacity in the round. Moreover, sustainability
(or lack thereof) has continued to be an important problem as capacity building initiatives
have not been able to achieve results that are likely to be sustainable and enduring once
donor engagement has come to an end. In large part this failure has been a consequence
of the diﬃculties international capacity builders have had in engaging with complex local
actors, circumstances and political environments, in which actors are multiple, agency is
negotiated, and outcomes are dynamic and iterative. This has damaged the legitimacy of
EU programmes as the latter are often perceived to be pursuing goals that are at odds with
local preferences and priorities. Notwithstanding the EU’s rhetorical commitment to local
ownership, many of these activities have prioritized forms of external technical and expert
approaches over embedded forms of local knowledge, practices and ways of doing things.
The article’s analysis is derived from secondary sources and primary data, including
oﬃcial EU documents and interviews. The ﬁeldwork in Brussels, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Kosovo and Somaliland took place between May 2016 and November 2016, totalling 48
interviews. Interviewees included, but were not limited to, EU oﬃcials, other international
oﬃcials (from other international organizations and Member State embassies), local gov-
ernmental representatives and employees of NGOs (local and international). All inter-
views have been coded to preserve anonymity.
Capacity building and local ownership
Capacity building has a long history. As Kuhl (2009, pp. 554–555) notes, capacity building
emerged in the development assistance community as early as the 1950s, through the rise
of so-called “institution building” approaches which aimed to strengthen governmental
infrastructure in newly independent postcolonial states. It also has parallels in the colonial
period, when local administrations were developed under imperial supervision. As Venner
(2015, p. 89) observes, capacity building in its modern form – in the sense of activities
aimed at strengthening individual skills and institutional competence in target ograniza-
tions – has its origins in US local government reforms of the 1970s. Capacity building in
this respect has a number of characteristics. It implies that the responsibility for the
achievement of development goals lies primarily at the local level, in the state, organiz-
ation, or community concerned. The primary obstacle to achieving these goals is a lack
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of “capacity” on the part of these actors, in the sense of the human and physical resources
required to deliver the desired outcomes. International capacity builders are cast in the
role of sponsors and tutors. Their role is to assist and support local actors in developing
their own competencies in the ﬁeld at hand. They are in a position to do so thanks to their
own practical experiences, resources and technical expertise, which are assumed to out-
strip those of the recipients (Bernstein & van der Ven, 2017, p. 527). As such, capacity
building is presented as an objective and apolitical activity. It is about providing appropri-
ate ideational and material tools to enable and empower local actors to meet the real-world
challenges they face.
Capacity building approaches have become increasingly prominent in peacebuilding in
recent years for four main reasons (Bueger & Tholens, forthcoming). First, their rise is in
part a consequence of a retreat from the more expansive and costly military interventions
of the initial post-cold war period, particularly the perceived failure of such interventions
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Second, they emerge from the increasing tendency to see security
and development as mutually reinforcing. International security actors have embraced
core ideas from development practitioners in their own activities, including themes such
as capacity building and resilience (Chandler, 2015, p. 2), in order to address the root
causes of insecurity. Third, the international security discourse has shifted from a focus on
civil war and humanitarian issues to concerns over transnational threats. Such threats are
seen to require transnational solutions, including contributions from countries in the
regions in which they manifest. Finally, capacity building appears to oﬀer an alternative to
so-called liberal peacebuilding; the ambitious, deeply politicized and largely unsuccessful
attempt to address state fragility and conﬂict by the emulative modelling of western liberal
democracies. In principle, capacity building approaches take a more bottom up approach
to developing local capacities in contrast to the “liberal peace” focus on top-down institution
building (Haldrup & Rosén, 2013, p. 130). Hence, the emphasis on “local ownership”.
Capacity building has been embraced by a range of international security actors, includ-
ing the EU. For example, the European Commission’s section for International
Cooperation and Development states that capacity building:
is an essential factor for the quality of our projects and programmes. The development of
capacity in partner countries is recognized as a key factor for improving aid eﬀectiveness.
Delivering sustainable results and increasing the impact of EU development policy is only
possible if there is eﬀective capacity in partner countries. (EC, 2018)
Similar rationales are visible amongst other key capacity-building donors too (HMG, 2014,
p. 12; US Department of State, 2010, p. 1). Such approaches are noteworthy in that they are
concerned not just with the strengthening of speciﬁc capacities in a purely operational
sense, but also with questions about how such capacities should best be employed,
managed and governed against a wider canvas of good governance, state-building and
reform. They also imply it is international actors who are the repositories of expertise
and best practice on how these things should be done (Bernstein & van der Ven, 2017,
p. 535). Thus, while such capacity building efforts may lack the overt politicization of
liberal peacebuilding approaches, they remain ambitious and normative in nature.
The concept of capacity building also places the responsibility for delivering outcomes
on the recipient states themselves. While international actors play an important role in
“empowering” them to do so, such processes are understood to be fundamentally
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endogenous in nature (Kuhl, 2009, p. 560). In consequence, the rise of capacity building as
a practice of international security has been accompanied by a similar rise in the discourse
of “local ownership”; that is, the notion that such activities will only be eﬀective and sus-
tainable if local actors – individuals, organizations and institutions – embrace fully the
capacity building endeavour themselves (Donais, 2012, p. 1). It also follows from this
that the success (or failure) of the EU’s local ownership and capacity building eﬀorts
relies at least to an extent on the situation in a given third country, as opposed to the
eﬃcacy of the EU’s policies themselves. This has in turn encouraged further attempts
by the EU and other international institutions to promote local ownership.
The rhetoric of local ownership has become increasingly prominent in international
capacity building and SSR activities in recent years, including for the EU (see Ejdus &
Juncos, 2018). Thus, the EU’s Toolkit for Capacity Development states that that projects
must be owned by those who seek to develop their capacity “otherwise it simply does
not happen”. Accordingly, local partners should be in the driving seat in the design of pro-
jects “to such a degree that their ownership and commitment remains intact or even
boosted” (EC, 2011, p. 9). Similarly, the EU’s strategic framework for supporting security
sector reform notes that to be “‘applicable and eﬀective’, programmes should be developed
on the basis of national owned processes”, and that “[r]eform eﬀorts will be eﬀective and
sustainable only if they are rooted in a country’s institutions […] owned by national secur-
ity and justice actors, and considered legitimate by society as a whole” (EC and HR, 2016,
p. 5, 7).
The requirement for local ownership is articulated around three justiﬁcations. The ﬁrst
of these is eﬀectiveness: international capacity building activities need the engagement and
commitment of local partners if they are to succeed. The second is sustainability: such
initiatives require local ownership if they are to endure, and if donors are to be able to
decrease their own commitments and eventually withdraw. The ﬁnal justiﬁcation is legiti-
macy. Legitimacy underpins eﬀectiveness and sustainability and, in many respects, lies at
the heart of the local ownership challenge. It implies that donor activities should be
planned and implemented in a way that is understood to be appropriate and desirable
by the actors, organizations and communities at whom they are targeted, generally in
the context of democratic principles and politics (Edmunds, 2017, p. 4). Hence, one
might expect that where local ownership is missing, the eﬀectiveness, sustainability and
legitimacy of capacity building activities will be jeopardized. In the rest of this article,
we examine EU capacity building activities in order to determine whether and to what
extent the EU has been able to foster local ownership and the impact this has had on
the eﬀectiveness, sustainability and legitimacy of its eﬀorts in the Western Balkans and
the Horn of Africa.
EU local capacity building: the record so far
EU security capacity building eﬀorts have been particularly prominent in the Western
Balkans and the Horn of Africa. These regions, which face a diverse range of political,
economic and security challenges, have witnessed the deployment of multiple EUmissions
and operations, working in a variety of security domains, including military reform and
training, police reform, justice and prison sector reform, maritime security, and border
security, amongst others.
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Eﬀectiveness and sustainability
Capacity building addresses not only the operational capacities of security forces, but also
the wider administrative, governance and judicial systems in which they sit and on which
they are dependent. Hence, these activities are, in conception, holistic in nature and
suggest the need for a comprehensive approach (EC and HR, 2013) or, even a more ambi-
tious, integrated approach (European Union, 2016). As stated in the EU Global Strategy,
“implementing a multi-dimensional approach through the use of all available policies and
instruments aimed at conﬂict prevention, management and resolution is essential” (Euro-
pean Union, 2016, p. 29). The rationale for such an approach appears sound. For instance,
in the area of police reform, an eﬀective police force will be of limited utility if the suspects
they arrest cannot be processed and tried by an ineﬀective judicial system, or if their staﬀ
are not paid due to a dysfunctional human resource management system (Hills, 2000,
pp. 53–54).
In practice, the EU and other donor programmes have often been overwhelmed by the
scale of the challenge presented by an integrated approach to capacity building and the
nature of the local context in which these activities have taken place. Such environments
commonly face acute shortages of skills, equipment and resources, that capacity building
programmes alone may struggle to ﬁll. At the same time, whatever the success or failure of
individual initiatives, these programmes are likely to ultimately be dependent on wider
governance challenges that lie beyond the speciﬁc remit of the initiative or organization
at hand. In Somalia, for example, the conditions for capacity building are heavily
inﬂuenced by the wider political environment of the state itself, including its fundamen-
tally contested nature, the persistence of clan-based power structures which often deter-
mine appointments and promotions within organizations, and the wider challenges of
political and economic development it faces in the aftermath of its civil war (Interview
HA01).
Assessment of the eﬀectiveness of EU capacity building activities thus needs to be set in
context. In many cases, they have simply not yet taken place on the scale nor over time-
scales necessary to inculcate transformative change in what are often very weak states that
are attempting to build these capacities from scratch. This is not to say that there have
been no success stories, at least in relation to building pockets of capacity in speciﬁc organ-
izations or security domains. A case in point is the establishment of the Peace Support
Operations Training Centre in Bosnia and Herzegovina (PSOTC), an international
project consisting of 12 countries helping Bosnia and Herzegovina to develop capacity
for training its own personnel before being deployed to peace support operations. In
the past ﬁve years, the PSOTC has become self-sustaining and now hosts international
oﬃcers from several countries. The centre has been given NATO certiﬁcation, there are
two courses which are EU and UN certiﬁed, and, at the end of 2016, it hosted a major
international conference with 65 participating countries (Interview BH02).
However, and despite these individual success stories, such initiatives have tended to be
limited to the speciﬁc cohort or project concerned, rather than in the holistic manner envi-
saged by the EU’s integrated approach. These challenges have been further complicated by
the multiple number of donors involved in a particular country, sector, or policy sphere.
Thus, the EU alone currently runs three major capacity building programmes in the
Western Indian Ocean region, all of which were initially developed as responses to the
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problem of piracy oﬀ the coast of Somalia: EUCAP Somalia, which focuses on building
Somali maritime security capacities; the Critical Maritime Routes Indian Ocean pro-
gramme (CRIMARIO), which works to build maritime situation awareness capacities
amongst states in the region; and the Programme to Promote Maritime Security
(MASE), which aims to promote maritime security capacities in East and Southern
Africa and the Indian Ocean. This is in addition to the plethora of other international
actors working in similar areas in the same region and various bilateral donors, many
of which are themselves EU members.
The maritime domain is not unique in this regard, and similarly crowded environments
for capacity building are visible elsewhere too, including in the Balkans, and across a wide
range of policy areas (Algar-Faria et al., 2018). This proliferation of programmes has often
led to problems of coordination, duplication, and sometimes even competition between
actors and initiatives. Very often, donors earmark resources for the same activity and
then compete over delivery, as was the case between Axiom International and EUCAP
Nestor in training the Somaliland Coastguard on how to use their newly built headquar-
ters in Hargeisa (Interview HA15; see also BH10 and BH11). This lack of coordination has
led to frustration among local stakeholders. An oﬃcial in the Somaliland Ministry of
Interior noted that the “key challenge” in implementing programmes has been overlap
between them and lack of coordination between donors (Interview HA03; also HA01).
Many of the interviewees expressed frustration about having to integrate and accommo-
date varying international approaches: “Training the national army is very challenging,
particularly when diﬀerent countries are trying to help, all with diﬀerent military training
approaches” (HA03). These problems risk “capacity building fatigue” amongst recipient
actors, and can lead to overstretch in already weak partner organizations as they struggle
to engage with international initiatives at the same time as meeting their day to day organ-
izational responsibilities (Bueger & Edmunds, 2018, p. 19).
EU capacity building activities have also struggled to be sustainable. They have com-
monly experienced two elements of vulnerability in this respect. The ﬁrst concerns the
general time-limited nature of donor projects, budgets and personnel appointments.
Such initiatives are often self-contained, in the sense that they are conceived and
implemented based on producing a speciﬁc deliverable, whether that is the delivery of stra-
tegic advice, a training programme or equipment donation. Even if these activities are suc-
cessful on their own terms, they may founder over time if they are not sustained by
appropriate follow-on support, or if they create islands of capacity in otherwise unre-
formed organizations (Interview BH03). Second, wider structural impediments may
blunt the impact of individual projects. Speciﬁc successes in training personnel will
only have a limited inﬂuence if those same personnel are not then employed in the pos-
itions for which they have been trained, for reasons of organizational politics or simply a
lack of communication, awareness, or understanding in the institution concerned. For
instance, some of the respondents noted that the donation of equipment, such as vehicles,
boats or computers, would have little impact if subsequent training were not provided for
how these should be used. Conversely, some training programmes provided skills, but not
equipment, while the resources to maintain and sustain equipment once in service were
often absent (Interviews HA02 and HA16).
These diﬃculties are indicative of the wider tension, discussed above, between EU pro-
grammes’ holistic ambitions for reform, on the one hand, and the narrow, specialist or
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organizationally speciﬁc demands of capacity building projects which neglect local cir-
cumstance, on the other. They also illustrate the pitfalls of assuming that individual
reforms will be sustained by formalized principles of organizational eﬀectiveness, in
societies that may operate in very diﬀerent ways in practice.
Ownership and legitimacy
Underpinning many of the above challenges is the sometimes diﬃcult relationship
between the international – in the sense of the EU as a capacity building donor – and
the local – i.e. the countries at which its various initiatives are targeted – generally
framed in terms of “local ownership”.
In practice, and with some exceptions in the Balkans particularly, the EU has struggled
to achieve local ownership in its capacity building programmes. Despite its positive rheto-
ric, programmes tend to be planned, funded and evaluated from Brussels, and
implemented on the ground by international staﬀ. While programme development
mainly takes place on the basis of (externally driven) local needs assessments, the depth
and thoroughness of such processes can be highly variable. For example, the technical
assessment mission that underpinned the ﬁrst phase of the €28.8 million per annum
EUCAP-Nestor programme took place over only one month, incorporated ﬁve countries
(Djibouti, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia and Tanzania), and was conducted by external
experts with little local knowledge of the states concerned. Indeed, as mentioned by an
EU diplomat, in its ﬁrst iteration, “Nestor was spectacularly ill-conceived” (quoted in
Ejdus, 2017, p. 472).
As it has matured, the EUCAP-Nestor (now EUCAP-Somalia) mission has worked to
address some of these problems. However, they remain a common feature of many pro-
grammes, and are, in some ways, inherent to the “project logic” that tends to drive them.
Programmes are conceived and funded around speciﬁc goals and often rather rigid and
time-limited criteria for judging success. Moreover, the staﬀ responsible for their
implementation tend to be employed on short-term contracts, ﬁxed to the speciﬁc
project timescales, which in turn limit opportunities for developing local knowledge
and relationships, and sustaining these over time. For example, with only two years
between each mission mandate renewal period, EULEX personnel had relatively little
time to focus on their work. As stated by one EULEX representative: “The mandate
change occurs in June and then the reconﬁguration is completed in November. So we
have only a 20-month cycle before the next change” (Interview KS13). Interviewees in
Bosnia and Herzegovina also complained about the high turnaround of international
staﬀ and their lack of local knowledge, including local language skills (Interviews BH03,
BH10, BH11 and BH12).
There are also deeper challenges that EU capacity builders have faced in transferring
their rhetorical commitments to local ownership into meaningful practice. Perhaps the
most basic of these relates to the contested meaning of the term “ownership”. At its
crudest, it can imply persuading, incentivising, or pressurizing local stakeholders to
come around to the donor’s way of thinking and support its programmes on these
terms. The degree to which ownership can be considered meaningfully local under such
circumstances is questionable. In practice, such approaches may encourage only the
superﬁcial or short-lived engagement by the locals concerned, with many local
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stakeholders complaining of not being involved in the formulation and implementation of
projects (Interviews BH03, BH07, BH11 and BH15).
Such challenges have been most pronounced in contexts such as Somalia where even
basic local capacities are absent. This may be due to profound institutional dysfunction
or severe local resource constraints, or because the issue area concerned is particularly
technical and specialized in nature. In these cases, establishing local ownership can be
more challenging, with donors facing a “chicken and egg” dilemma: they desire local
engagement in capacity building for the reasons discussed above, but capacity building
itself is necessary before that engagement can meaningfully occur. Thus, for example,
even a local needs assessment requires some specialist knowledge in order to identify
what capacities need to be strengthened and why. In the Somali case, decades of war
and state weakness – and indeed the very fact that so many institutions are being built
from scratch – means that local actors are often dependent on donors to provide the
very competencies that are necessary for local ownership to be meaningful (Interviews
HA02 and HA05). Similarly, a lack of ﬁnancial resources can create a dependency of
local actors on donor contributions simply in order to function, let alone assert ownership
over a programme or initiative. In essence, locals may know that they should be coordi-
nating and leading activities, but simply lack the capacity to do so (Interview HA04). Such
problems can create frustration for donors anxious to get things done and achieve their
goals within project timescales, and might also lead to the distrust of local actors
(Bueger, 2012, p. 10).
Capacity building in such cases will likely require investment in the development of
basic skills and human resources, prior to, or in parallel with, other activities. In these
and other contexts, the practice of “ownership” is likely to involve an iterative process
of engagement and dialogue between international capacity builders and local actors.
This suggests diﬃculties with the notion of “local ownership” more widely. Where pol-
itical authority is fragmented or contested, identifying whose ownership counts, and
whose ownership should count, can be diﬃcult. As one EUCAP Nestor oﬃcial
explained:
There is no middle in their [the Somali] bureaucracy. In my home country you engage civil
servants because with politicians you don’t have the continuity […] In Somalia you don’t
have that. All the people that work now might disappear after the next elections. (Interview
HA07)
Under these circumstances, establishing local ownership can be considerably more
challenging as EU donors face basic questions of where political authority lies for par-
ticular policy sectors. They may also face accusations of bias by appearing to favour one
organization or faction over another, or ﬁnd themselves frozen out when power shifts
occur. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the complex institutional set-up of the country as a
result of the Dayton Agreement complicates the nature of capacity building in the
security sector and attempts to build the capacities at the state level have often been
rejected at the entity level, in particular by Bosnian Serbs (Interviews BH02, BH05,
BH06 and BH12).
Establishing local engagement in a project may be more straightforward in states
where institutions are settled, divisions of responsibility and chains of command are
clear, and where there is broad consensus on the political direction of travel and the
8 T. EDMUNDS ET AL.
role of capacity building within this. Such was the case with regard to earlier EU capacity
building and security sector reform initiatives in parts of the Western Balkans such as
Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro (Edmunds, 2007, pp. 253–254). Either way, it is clear
that local environments are themselves heterogeneous rather than monolithic. They
may incorporate both supporters and opponents of reform, and support or opposition
may manifest diﬀerently across or even within diﬀerent capacity building initiatives.
For example, in Somalia, EU capacity building activities have often been broadly wel-
comed at the operational level because they bring new resources, both human and
ﬁnancial, into the often chronically under-funded institutions and organizations con-
cerned (Interviews HA01, HA02, HA03, HA04 and HA06). However, they have also
sometimes been resisted for not ﬁtting closely enough with local political priorities or
needs, or for bypassing established patterns of organizational hierarchy and command
(Ejdus, 2017, p. 474).
In practice, programmes have rarely been static or linear in terms of the way they
impact on the local environments in which they take place (Schroeder & Chappuis,
2014, p. 134). Instead, they evolve in dialogue with circumstance, and in ways that are
shaped by the push and pull of both local and international actors (Zimmerman, 2016,
p. 103). In consequence, the international-local nexus in most EU capacity building pro-
grammes has often manifested as a dynamic process of exchange and negotiation between
actors, rather than a zero-sum game with a rigidly ﬁxed end point. Thus, the pertinent
question is often less about “ownership” per se, and more about how to faciliate and
enable the variety of agents engaged in any given project to achieve objectives that are
of mutually agreed beneﬁt to both donors and locals.
What does this messy dynamism mean for the local legitimacy of EU capacity building
programmes? As the discussion above suggests, EU capacity building has often been wel-
comed as a sign of international engagement and interest, and as a new source of
resources. However, an embedded sense of local agency in these programmes is largely
absent (Interviews HA01, HA02, HA03, HA04 and HA06). Accordingly, it might be
said that EU capacity building programmes in the region have acquired a “thin” legitimacy
– in the sense that they have been broadly accepted and often welcomed by a small section
of elite local actors, even if they are not always seen to be successful in practice, nor par-
ticularly cognizant of local needs.1 However, it is also clear that such initiatives have yet to
be fully internalized and adopted by local actors on their own terms, and have little buy-in
from the wider society. In most cases, locals do not decide what programmes are needed
and why, and they have little to no role in driving their implementation and assessment. In
this way, and to date at least, such activities lack the “thick” legitimacy – in the sense of the
capacity building agenda being accepted and understood in its entirety – that would make
them self-sustaining and enduringly eﬀective over time in the absence of external tutelage
and funding.
Conclusion
If EU capacity building is to succeed and to endure in the absence of external support then
the question of local ownership needs to be taken seriously. Part of this consideration is
technical and, at least on the surface, relatively straightforward to accomplish. It is
about doing capacity building better and, in particular, striving to make programmes
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more responsive, adaptive, and sensitive to local circumstances, by engaging local partners
more substantively in planning, implementation, coordination and evaluation. However, if
such engagement is to be meaningful over the long term it also requires a much bolder and
more ﬂexible understanding of what local ownership in capacity building actually entails
and how this should be encouraged in practice.
A ﬁrst step might be to move away from the somewhat tokenistic status of the “local
ownership” concept in the ﬁrst place. Its aspirations are signiﬁcant, and in many ways
admirable, in that it points towards the undoubted need for greater partnership and
legitimacy in capacity building activities. Yet, the concept obscures as much as it
reveals. In practice, the “local” is a diverse and heterogeneous space; one in which a
variety of diﬀerent local actors interact, many of whom have quite diﬀerent political pri-
orities and agendas, and diﬀerent predications, capacities or skills with which to engage
international donors. At the same time, capacity building on the ground is a dynamic
and evolving activity. Programmes themselves take shape and produce outcomes in
an iterative dialogue with both political and strategic circumstances, but also with the
actors – both local and international – through which the programmes take place. For
these reasons, it is often neither clear that the notion of the “local” captures the complex-
ity and diversity of the political and organizational communities in which capacity
building takes place; nor what the outcome to be “owned” at the end of this process is
or should be.
These dilemmas have contributed to the legitimacy deﬁcit experienced by many EU
capacity building activities to date. If this deﬁcit is to be addressed, the EU has to take
seriously the need to support local actors in taking meaningful control of the organiz-
ational spaces at which capacity building is targeted. Doing so in practice is often less
about the rhetorical transfer of “ownership” to “locals”. In reality it is more about fostering
environments in which the various agencies of the international and local actors con-
cerned – all with their own respective strengths and weaknesses – can work productively
together to achieve mutually beneﬁcial ends. Doing so will necessarily entail relinquishing
a degree of control on the part of donors in order to create the space and time for pro-
grammes to develop in their own dynamic and sometimes rather messy way. Such an
approach would better reﬂect the reality of such activities on the ground. It would also
give meaning to the aspirations for local empowerment on which the capacity building
endeavour is, in concept at least, based.
Note
1. This conceptualization of thick and thin legitimacy is draws on Walzer (1994) and related
literatures. See Gilley (2007) for a review.
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